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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Sasha Martinez appeals, challenging several decisions made by the district court 
in regard to the evidence it considered when it imposed her sentence, and when it 
affirmed that sentence at the subsequent I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) hearing. First, 
it erroneously permitted the prosecutor to read a statement made to police by one of 
Ms. Martinez's co-defendants (Luis Espinoza) into the record. That decision was 
impermissible because the decision to allow that evidence to be admitted in lieu of live 
testimony violated Ms. Martinez's right to confront the witness, as afforded by the Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as well as by the state and federal due process 
clauses. Additionally, when such hearsay statements are introduced into the record at 
sentencing, the defendant needs to be afforded the opportunity to rebut or explain that 
evidence, and the district court in this case explicitly refused to consider the testimony 
offered in that regard. 
However, the district court declined to hear or consider the proffered testimony at 
sentencing, and again at the Rule 35 hearing (she offered the testimony of another 
co-defendant (Yvon Lopez) at the sentencing hearing and her mother at the Rule 35 
hearing). Aside from violating Ms. Martinez's constitutional rights, those decisions also 
unreasonably limited the information available to the district court at sentencing, which 
also constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
These errors, either individual or cumulative, demonstrate the need to vacate 
Ms. Martinez's sentence and remand her case for a new sentencing hearing, or 
alternatively, a new Rule 35 hearing. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Martinez pled guilty to her role in a convenience store robbery. (Tr., Vol. 1 , 
p.11, Ls.9-17.)1 She had entered the store ahead of her companions and unplugged 
the store's video camera. (Tr., Vol.1, p.11, Ls.14-17.) She exited the store before the 
others entered. (Tr. Vol. 1 , p.11, Ls.14-15.) The three others then entered the store 
brandishing two knives and one bat. (Police Reports attached to the Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pAl All three were wearing masks and gloves, 
and left with the money from the till, as well as some cigarettes.3 (Police Reports, pA.) 
Before leaving, the male robber struck the store's ice cream machine with the bat, 
damaging it. (Police Reports, p.7.) 
However, the camera had a backup power system, causing the entire sequence 
of events to be recorded. (Police Reports, p.6.) Ms. Martinez was identified from the 
recording. (Police Reports, p.6.) Officers searched her residence, locating the stolen 
cigarettes, the mask and clothing worn by one of the robbers, and Mr. Espinoza himself, 
although he initially gave a false name. (Police Reports, p.6.) Mr. Espinoza was taken 
into custody on outstanding warrants and providing a false statement. (Police Reports, 
p.9.) Ms. Martinez was taken into custody at a later date. (Police Reports, p.12.) 
1 The transcripts for this case are contained in two independently-paginated volumes. 
To promote clarity, the volume containing the change of plea hearing of April 7, 2011, 
the continuation of the sentencing hearing held on May 26, 2011, and the Rule 35 
hearing held on October 20, 2011, will be referred to as "Vol.1." The volume containing 
the initial part of the sentencing hearing held on May 25, 2011, which was subsequently 
augmented to the record, will be referred to as "VoI.2." 
2 Despite being authored by different officers, the police reports are consecutively 
paginated in the bottom right corner of the documents. 
3 The other three individuals were later identified as Luis Espinoza, Yvon Lopez, and 
"Wetta" or "Tanya" (last name unknown). (See, e.g., Police Reports, pp.1 0-11.) 
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During an interview at the jail, Mr. Espinoza made statements to police, oral and 
written, in which he attempted to cast responsibility on Ms. Martinez. (See Police 
Reports, p.i0.) However, during her own interview with officers, Ms. Martinez informed 
them that Mr. Espinoza had been the driving force behind the group's actions. 
(See Police Reports, pp.i1-i2.) She provided a written statement to that effect, which 
is attached the PSI. In addition, she gave letters to the officers, which indicated that 
Mr. Espinoza had been controlling in their relationship, to the point of controlling when 
she could talk to investigators.4 (See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.43, L.2i - p.44, L.6.) 
As part of the plea agreement in her case, Ms. Martinez agreed to pay restitution 
on all the charges, and the State agreed to limit its recommendation to six years total. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.5, L.2i - p.6, L.5.) All other terms were left open for argument. (Tr., Vol. 1 , 
p.6, Ls.3-4.) At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel discussed the various 
mitigating factors the district court should consider in regard to Ms. Martinez. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.29, LS.i5 - p.49, L.i5; Vo1.2, p.9, L.i9 - p.i3, L.4l For example, he 
discussed the fact that she had been violently raped as a child, and how that event had 
affected her behavior thereafter. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.9, L.24 - p.i 0, L.i4.) He also discussed 
her struggles with post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, bipolar disorder, and 
4 It does not appear that these letters were ever presented to the district court or 
entered into the record, only that defense counsel made representations about their 
contents. (See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.43, L.2i - p.44, L.6; see generally R. and PSI.) Rather, the 
district court appeared to believe that they were part of the statements Mr. Espinoza 
had made to the police, and which were discussed in the police reports. (Tr., Vol. 1 , 
p.53, L.25 - p.54, L.i2.) Defense counsel did not object to the district court's 
characterization of the statements. (See general/yTr., pp.53-54.) 
5 At the original sentencing hearing, there was some confusion regarding whether 
Ms. Martinez had applied for and been accepted into the mental health specialty court, 
either in Bonneville or Bingham Counties. (Tr., VoL2, p.i3, L. 7 - p.i6, L.25.) The 
sentencing hearing was continued for one day so that the district court could locate the 
appropriate information. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1 , p.i6, Ls.i3-i4.) 
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schizophrenia, as well as her newly-initiated efforts (prior to the robbery) to address 
those problems. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.11, Ls.10-1B.) In fact, he pointed out that Ms. Martinez 
had been deemed a low risk to society in the PSI evaluations and had been cooperative 
with investigators. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.40, Ls.20-22, p.43, Ls.B-14.) 
Finally, he discussed how Ms. Martinez's relationship with Mr. Espinoza had 
impacted her behavior. (Tr., Vol.2, p.43, L.4 - p.44, L.6.) Ms. Martinez presented 
evidence to investigators demonstrating that Mr. Espinoza had been controlling in their 
relationship, particularly certain letters where he dictated when she could talk to the 
authorities. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.43, L.21 - p.44, L.6.) The prosecutor then proposed to read 
Mr. Espinoza's statement to the police into the record. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.51, Ls.23-25.) 
Defense counsel objected because "[t]his is a written statement." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.52, 
L.13-14.) The district court overruled the objection because "sentencing hearings are 
not subject to the Rules of Evidence." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.52, Ls.15-16.) Partway through the 
statement, defense counsel objected again, this time based on confrontation grounds. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.53, Ls.21-24.) The district court overruled that objection as well, asserting 
that it was part of the police report, to which defense counsel had referred during his 
comments. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.54, Ls.1-12.) 
When the prosecutor finished his statements, defense counsel requested to 
present a rebuttal witness, Yvon Lopez, one of the other people involved in the robbery. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.57, Ls.2-6.) Defense counsel represented that she would be able to refute 
or otherwise clarify several of the assertions Mr. Espinoza had made in his statement. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.57, Ls.9-12.) However, the district court flatly refused to hear that 
testimony or consider that evidence. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.57, Ls.3, 7 -B, 13.) Instead, it decided 
4 
to impose a unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed, on Ms. Martinez, 
and it retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.51-52.) 
The district court ultimately relinquished jurisdiction. (R., p.59.) Ms. Martinez 
filed a timely Rule 35 motion.6 (R., p.60.) Ms. Martinez's own affidavit, as well as letters 
of support from her mother and sister, as well as several friends, was included with that 
motion. (R., pp.62-73.) The matter was scheduled for a hearing. (See R., p.4.) 
Defense counsel attempted to call Ms. Martinez's mother to present evidence in support 
of the motion at that hearing, but the district court refused to hear that testimony, stating 
"I don't do a new evidentiary hearing." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.72, L.22 - p.73, L.7.) Defense 
counsel then asked "You don't allow anything additional?" to which the district court 
responded "I do not." (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.73, Ls.5-7.) The district court ultimately denied the 
Rule 35 motion. (R., p.76.) Ms. Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal from the 
Judgment of Conviction, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction, and the order denying the 
Rule 35 motion.? (R., pp.79-80.) 
6 Although the motion does not mention Rule 35 itself, the prosecutor pointed out that 
Rule 35 was the appropriate procedural device for a defendant to pursue a request to 
reconsider the relinquishment decision. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.80, Ls.6-16.) The district court 
accepted that characterization of Ms. Martinez's motion. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.80, L.17.) 
? An amended notice of appeal was filed later. (R., pp.86-88.) 
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ISSUES 
1" Whether the district court erroneously permitted Mr. Espinoza's statement to be 
read into the record without affording Ms. Martinez the opportunity to confront 
Mr. Espinoza or present rebuttal evidence. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by improperly limiting the 
evidence available, both at the sentencing hearing and the Rule 35 hearing. 
3. Whether the district court's numerous errors entitle Ms. Martinez to relief 




The District Court Erroneously Permitted Mr. Espinoza's Statement To Be Read 
Into The Record Without Affording Ms. Martinez The Opportunity To Confront 
Mr. Espinoza Or Present Rebuttal Evidence 
A. Introduction 
The district court made two related errors in regard to Mr. Espinoza's statement. 
First, presenting the statement without providing Ms. Martinez with an opportunity to 
cross-examine Mr. Espinoza violated her constitutional rights to confront the witnesses 
against her, as well as to due process. Second, presentation of hearsay evidence, 
while sometimes permissible at sentencing hearings, must, nonetheless, be followed by 
an opportunity for the defendant to refute or explain that evidence. The district court 
erred by not providing Ms. Martinez the opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
Mr. Espinoza or to present rebuttal evidence in regard to his statement. Any of these 
errors constitutes a ground upon which this Court should vacate Ms. Martinez's 
sentence. 
B. The District Court Violated Ms. Martinez's Sixth Amendment Right To Confront 
The Witness Against Her 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that: "In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend VI.8 The term "criminal prosecutions" was 
8 Idaho does not have an equivalent provision in its state constitution. See, e.g., State 
v. Mantz, 148 Idaho 303, 305 n.1 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 
502 (1980)). Nevertheless, defendants in Idaho are still afforded the protections set 
forth under the federal Constitution. Id. However, Idaho does recognize an 
independent right to confrontation, which arises from the Fourteenth Amendment's 
promise of due process. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766-67 (2007). The 
implications of that right will be discussed in Section I(C), infra. 
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and is understood to include all stages of the prosecution process, which includes 
sentencing. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 288, 
288-406 (1765-1769) at 375, 406 (identifying judgment and punishment as one of the 
final stages of the criminal prosecution); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) 
(holding that defendants at probation revocations do not get the full panoply of rights 
because the probation revocation occurs after "the end of the criminal prosecution, 
including imposition of sentence"). Therefore, because criminal prosecutions 
encompass sentencing, the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing hearings. 
See U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
There is an additional policy reason to continue applying that protection at 
sentencing hearings: a vast majority of cases are resolved via plea agreements,9 
meaning the sentencing hearing is often the only opportunity that the State will have to 
present evidence or testimony in aggravation and that the defendant will have to 
challenge that evidence or confront those witnesses. As that has become the case, the 
confrontation clause needs to be applicable at sentencing hearings, lest the vast 
majority of defendants in the modern judicial system be denied its protection. 
The Confrontation Clause bars, inter alia, admission of "testimonial statements" 
when the declarants of those statements were not subjected to cross-examination. 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2006). Idaho follows the Crawford 
9 For example, in 2002, approximately ninety-five percent of state felony convictions 
were obtained via plea agreements. Maguire, Kathleen, ed. Sourcebook of Criminal 
Justice Statistics Online, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Table 5.46.2002, 
http://www.albany.edu/ sourcebook/pdf/t5462002.pdf (last accessed August 2, 2012). 
That trend has continued, as approximately ninety-four percent of state felony 
convictions were still achieved via plea agreements in 2006. Id., Table 5.46.2006, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/ t5462006.pdf (last accessed August 2,2012). 
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analysis. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 142-43 (2007). The Crawford Court set forth 
three categories of testimonial statements: (1) ex parte in-court testimony or its 
equivalent (custodial examinations, for example) 10; (2) formalized, extra-judicial 
statements (such as affidavits or depositions); and (3) statements which an objective 
witness would reasonably believe to be for prosecutorial purposes. Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 51-52; Hooper, 145 Idaho at 143. To determine whether a statement falls into the 
third category, courts employ the "primary purpose" test. See Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813, 822 (2006); Hooper, 145 Idaho at 143. Under the primary purpose test, if the 
statement is made during a police interview and is for the primary purpose of 
establishing or proving facts which might be used in a future prosecution (as opposed to 
addressing an on-going emergency where there is imminent danger to member(s) of the 
community), it is considered testimonial,11 Id.; see State v. Sanchez, 147 Idaho 521, 
524-25 (Ct. App. 2009). A testimonial statement is generally inadmissible unless the 
opposing party is afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.12 Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 53-54; Hooper, 145 Idaho at 142-43. 
In this case, Mr. Espinoza made his statement while he was incarcerated. As 
such, his statements should qualify under the first Crawford category - a custodial 
10 In fact, the "[pJrincipal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was ... 
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
50; see Hooper, 145 Idaho at 143. 
11 In Idaho, the decision of whether a statement is testimonial (and thereby, what the 
primary purpose of the interview was) is determined by looking at the totality of the 
circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373 (2009). 
12 The Crawford Court recognized that an exception to this rule existed if the declarant 
was unavailable to give testimony and the defendant had already been provided an 
opportunity to cross examine the declarant. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. However, 
there has been no showing that Mr. Espinosa was unavailable to give testimony, and in 
any case, Ms. Martinez had been afforded no prior opportunity to cross-examine him. 
(See generally R.) Therefore, since neither prong of the exception is present in this 
case, the exception is inapplicable. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. 
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examination. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52; Hooper, 145 Idaho at 143. And even if 
it does not, the totality of the circumstances reveal that it would qualify under the third 
category as well, since a reasonable person would conclude that the primary purpose of 
the interview was to establish the facts of the robbery for a potential future prosecution. 
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; Hooper, 145 Idaho at 143. The interview was with police 
personnel while Mr. Espinoza was in custody, and was a formal interview, complete with 
Mr. Espinoza's attorney. Compare Sanchez, 147 Idaho at 524-25 (where an interview 
of the declarant with non-police personal in a non-formal setting was deemed to be not 
for the primary purpose of investigation). In fact, as an ex parte examination, it is a 
statement, the use of which as evidence was condemned by the Crawford Court. See 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. "Such statements under official interrogation are an obvious 
substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on direct 
examination; they are inherently testimoniaL" Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 373 (quoting 
Davis 547 U.S. at 830). Therefore, because it allowed the statement to be read into the 
record without affording Ms. Martinez the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Espinoza, 
the district court violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against her. 
As such, this Court should vacate her sentence and remand for further proceedings. 
See, e.g., Hooper, 145 Idaho at 146-47. 
C. The District Court Violated Ms. Martinez's State And Federal Constitutional 
Rights To Due Process By Denying Her The Opportunity To Confront The 
Witness Against Her 
Should this Court decide that the Confrontation Clause does not apply at 
sentencing, the district court's decisions nevertheless violated Ms. Martinez's 
constitutional right to confrontation pursuant to her right to due process. While the 
Idaho Constitution may not have a provision in its state constitution directly regarding 
10 
confrontation, it still affords defendants the right to confront adversarial witnesses as 
part of it promise of due process of law. See IDAHO CONST. art. I § 13. It requires that 
defendants have a full and fair hearing, and a part of such a hearing is the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses, unless there is good cause to forego that 
procedure. 13 Rose, 144 Idaho at 767; see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); 
United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d, 1166, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 1999); but see Williams 
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 243 (1949) (bringing into question whether a due process 
right to confrontation exists at the federal level).14 The Idaho Supreme Court has 
recognized that the due process right to confrontation is also found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the federal constitution. 15 Rose, 144 Idaho at 767 (see footnote 8, 
supra). As such, that right is independent from the Sixth Amendment and the Crawford 
analysis, and is a product of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of due process. 
13 While the Idaho Supreme Court recognized this right in the context of probation 
revocation, the Court also recognized that probationers do not enjoy the full panoply of 
due process rights. Rose, 144 Idaho at 765 (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480). 
Logically, the defendant at sentencing should also be afforded that minimum set of due 
process rights. See id.; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480; see also State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 
472, 474 (1977) (recognizing that, at sentencing, the defendant has the due process 
right to a hearing and to be present at that hearing, whereas, at probation revocation, 
the defendant does not have a similar right to hearing, indicating that the defendant has 
more due process rights at sentencing than she does at probation revocation). 
14 Idaho is fully able to recognize and provide more constitutional protections than those 
mandated by the federal Constitution. Bracey v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997). 
Rather, the federal Constitution and the subsequent interpretations establish a floor of 
protections which must be provided. See Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 
U.S. 868, 889 (2009). Therefore, regardless of whether such a right exists under the 
federal Constitution is irrelevant, since Idaho has recognized and enforced that right on 
its own. See, e.g., Rose, 144 Idaho at 767. 
15 "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law." U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 1. Numerous other jurisdictions also recognize this 
aspect of the due process right, as well as its independence from Crawford. See Rose, 
144 Idaho at 767-68 (citing an extensive number of decisions from other jurisdictions 
recognizing and holding the same). 
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Unlike the Sixth Amendment protections, the due process right may be limited if 
the statement bears certain "earmarks of reliability." Rose, 144 Idaho at 767 (quoting 
Young v. United States, 863 A.2d 804, 808 (D.C. 2004) (in turn quoting Morrissey, 408 
U.S. at 481)). A co-defendant's statement, however, is inherently unreliable. See, e.g., 
State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581,584 (1980); I.C. § 19-2117 (requiring corroboration of 
a co-defendant's statement, as such a statement, by itself, is insufficient to support a 
conviction). As such, the defendant needs to be able to cross-examine the declarant, 
so as to probe the reliability of the statement and credibility of the witness. 
See Johnson, 101 Idaho at 584. Such protections are necessary to prevent a 
co-defendant from fabricating a story which either implicates an innocent person or 
secures a more favorable sentence for himself. Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho 46, 49 
(Ct. App. 2001); State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 890, 891 (2009). 
The second of those concerning scenarios is at play in this case. Mr. Espinoza 
made a statement which down played his role in the robbery, trying to shift his 
responsibility onto Ms. Martinez. (See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.52, L.10 - p.55, L.21; Police Reports, 
pp.10-11.) He is also known to lie to authorities in order to try and evade capture. 16 
(See, e.g., Police Reports, p.6 (showing Mr. Espinoza gave a false name to officers 
investigating the robbery).) Furthermore, defense counsel represented to the district 
court that one of the other co-defendants, Ms. Lopez, was willing to testify, and that 
testimony would not be corroborating to Mr. Espinoza's version of events. (See Tr., 
Vol. 1 , p.57 Ls.2-12.) In light of such circumstances, Mr. Espinoza's statement could not 
16 Ms. Martinez, on the other hand, was determined to be a low risk if allowed to return 
to the community instead of being imprisoned. (See, e.g., Idaho Standard Mental 
Health Assessment attached to PSI, p.3; Tr., Vol. 1 , pAO, Ls.19-22.) To that end, her 
attorney pointed out that she had been cooperative with the investigation efforts upon 
getting in contact with officers. (See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.43, Ls.8-25.) 
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be reasonably relied upon as it bore no earmarks of reliability. As such, the district 
court needed to allow Ms. Martinez the opportunity to confront Mr. Espinoza, subjecting 
him and his statements to the crucible of cross-examination. By refusing to grant her 
that opportunity, the district court violated Ms. Martinez's constitutional right to 
confrontation and due process. See, e.g., Rose, 144 Idaho at 767. As such, this Court 
should vacate Ms. Martinez's sentence and remand the case for further proceedings. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Improperly Limiting The Evidence Available, 
Both At The Sentencing Hearing And The Rule 35 Hearing 
A. Introduction 
In addition to the violation of Ms. Martinez's constitutional rights, discussed 
supra, the district court also erred by unduly restricting the evidence in the record, and 
thus, unreasonably limited its discretion, both at the sentencing hearing and at the Rule 
35 hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the district court refused to hear proffered 
testimony offered by Ms. Martinez to clarify what had happened when the group of 
people decided to rob the convenience store. At the Rule 35 hearing, the district court 
not only refused to hear testimony from Ms. Martinez's mother in support of her 
daughter, but it declared that it did not accept any new testimony at Rule 35 hearings. 
Both decisions constitute an abuse of its discretion, and this Court should remedy those 
errors. 
B. The District Court Unreasonably Limited Its Discretion By Refusing To Hear Or 
Consider The Evidence Proffered 
The district court cannot unreasonably limit the evidence it considers when 
considering the appropriateness of a sentence or deciding whether to grant a Rule 35 
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motion. See State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 824 (Ct. App. 2008). This is because 
unduly limiting the evidence presented, prevents it from fulfilling its duty at such 
hearings, which is to consider "the nature and circumstances of the crime ... and the 
condition of the defendant." State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568, 574 (2011) (quoting 
I.C. § 19-2521(1)). In this case, the district court's decision to not hear Ms. Lopez's 
testimony deprived it of evidence necessary to accurately understand the nature and 
circumstances of the crime. (See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.57, LsA-12.) And the district court's 
refusal to hear Ms. Martinez's mother deprived it of evidence necessary to consider the 
condition of the defendant. (See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.72, L.22 - p.73, L.2.) 
In regard to the Rule 35 hearing particularly, the exchange between defense 
counsel and the district court reveals the extent of the district court's error: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have a witness I would like to call, 
[Ms. Martinez's] mother. 
THE COURT: Well, this is not an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary 
hearing was held at the [rider] facility.17 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right. 
THE COURT: And I don't do a new evidentiary hearing. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. You don't allow anything additional? 
THE COURT: I do not. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.72, L.22 - p.73, L.7 (emphasis added).) This is critical because the Idaho 
Supreme Court has clearly stated that "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the 
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional 
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." 
17 The district court's statement in this regard is permissible only if this were a hearing to 
decide whether to relinquish jurisdiction. See State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143 
(2001). However, as this was a hearing held on a Rule 35 motion (see Tr., Vol. 1 , p.80, 
Ls.12-16), that rationale is inappropriate. Rather, the need for evidentiary presentations 
is governed by State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007), et aI., which (as will be 
discussed infra) explicitly require the defendant to present evidence in support of her 
motion, demonstrating the district court's error. 
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State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). Additionally, part of the due process 
afforded a defendant challenging a decision to relinquish jurisdiction via a Rule 35 
motion is to present evidence or otherwise challenge the information presented by the 
state supporting the relinquishment See Tolman v. State, 128 Idaho 643,646 (Ct App. 
1996) (finding no prejudice regarding a recommendation for relinquishment because the 
defendant had been afforded the full due process protections necessary at the hearing 
held on the defendant's Rule 35 motion challenging the relinquishment). In this case, 
however, by refusing to allow Ms. Martinez to present evidence in favor of her motion, 
the district court violated those principles, thus abusing its discretion. The result is a 
Catch-22 for Ms. Martinez18: she must present new evidence in support of her Rule 35 
motion, but the district court will not permit her to present that new evidence. 19 Such a 
result cannot be permitted. 
Avoiding such impermissible situations is why district courts abuse their 
discretion, either by limiting the evidence they consider regarding a sentence or 
"wholly disregarding proffered information about the defendant .... " State v. Findeisen, 
119 Idaho 903, 905 (Ct App. 1991); State v. Bayless, 131 Idaho 624, 626 (Ct App. 
1998); Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824. This is not an absolute rule, as, for example, the 
district court is not required to hold a hearing on Rule 35 motions, which does effectively 
limit its ability to receive certain evidence. See Bayless, 131 Idaho at 626. However, 
18 As the district court indicated this was its policy in regard to all such motions, the 
Catch-22 is extended to impact all defendants presenting such motions. Such global 
self-restrictions of discretion are also inappropriate. See Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824. 
19 The appellate courts do not speculate as to whether the proffered evidence might 
have been submitted in affidavits. State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 583 (Ct App. 
1988). Nor do the appellate courts speculate as to what effect the proffered evidence 
might have had on the district court's decision. Id. The refusal to accept the proffered 
evidence, by itself, warrants remand. See id. 
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once it decides that it will hold a hearing on a Rule 35 motion, then it is impermissible 
for the district court to limit the evidence presented at that hearing. Id.; State v. Braaten, 
144 Idaho 606, 610 n.2 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that due process is still in force 
throughout the relinquishment proceedings regardless of the fact that the defendant 
may not be entitled to an actual hearing on relinquishment). Ultimately, at either a 
sentencing hearing or a Rule 35 hearing, "[w]hen a judge refuses to consider any 
additional information, he erroneously narrows the scope of his own discretion." 
Bonaparte, 114 Idaho at 582. Doing so constitutes reversible error. See, e.g., id; 
Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824. As the district court erroneously narrowed the scope of its 
discretion at both Ms. Martinez's sentencing and Rule 35 hearings by refusing to hear or 
consider the testimony of proffered witnesses, it abused its discretion. See id. As such, 
those decisions should be vacated and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
III. 
The District Court's Numerous Errors Entitle Ms. Martinez To Relief Pursuant To The 
Cumulative Error Doctrine 
A. Introduction 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds the errors set forth in sections I and II 
to have been individually harmless, Ms. Martinez asserts that the errors combined 
amount to cumulative error. The cumulative error doctrine should apply to sentencing 
and Rule 35 hearings because the right deprived as a result of those errors is the due 
process right to a fair hearing. And, in this case, the district court's numerous errors 
justify relief because Ms. Martinez was deprived of her due process rights by those 
errors. 
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B. The Cumulative Error Doctrine Should Apply To Sentencing And Rule 35 
Hearings 
The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of 
which alone might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair 
hearing in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process. See, e.g., 
State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). The language in Idaho 
precedent all speak in terms of "fair triaL" See, e.g., State v. Walter D. Moore, 131 
Idaho 814, 823 (1998); State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 723 (2009); State v. 
Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999); Paciorek, 137 Idaho at 635. 
Nevertheless, Ms. Martinez contends that the analysis and doctrine are just as 
applicable to an accumulation of errors made during sentencing following a guilty plea. 
That question appears to be one of first impression in Idaho. 
The cumulative error doctrine is applicable to sentencing and Rule 35 hearings 
because the right violated by the conglomeration of errors is the defendant's right to due 
process (as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and 
Article I, § 13 of the state constitution). See, e.g., Severson, 147 Idaho at 723. 
Therefore, the appropriate question is whether a defendant's due process rights at a 
given hearing were violated by the accumulation of errors. See id. 
Defendants are entitled to due process at sentencing hearings. See, e.g., State 
v. Morgan, 109 Idaho 1040 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the due process safeguards 
established in State v. Walt Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 17 (1969) are "indispensible to a fair 
sentencing process); see also State v. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 792 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(holding that vindictive sentencing violates the defendant's due process rights). 
Similarly, once the district court has decided to afford the defendant a hearing on her 
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Rule 35 motion,20 it must afford her due process at that hearing. See, e.g., Tolman, 128 
Idaho at 646 (holding that the due process protections afforded during a Rule 35 
hearing served to cure any prejudice caused by errors in the initial recommendation to 
relinquish jurisdiction). As a result of these protections, the cumulative error doctrine 
should also apply during those hearings.21 Additionally, because the vast majority of 
cases are resolved by guilty pleas (see page 8 note 9, supra), as opposed to trials, 
limiting the application of the cumulative error doctrine to only trials would completely 
deprive the vast majority of defendants of the protection of due process throughout their 
cases when it is deprived through accumulated errors. 
Where the cumulative error test is applicable, the appellate court reviews the 
individual errors for merit first. Lovelass, 133 Idaho at 171. This means that the 
appellate court's first determination is whether there is evidence that district court made 
an error, not whether any error is harmless, because even an accumulation of 
individually harmless errors is capable of depriving the defendant of a fair hearing. 
20 The decision of whether or not a hearing is necessary to resolve such a motion is left 
to the district court's discretion. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 689 
(Ct. App. 1999). 
21 Several of the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have implied that the cumulative error 
doctrine does extend to these non-trial hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Lightly, 616 
F.3d 321, 371 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that the cumulative error doctrine applies where 
otherwise harmless errors are widespread or prejudicial enough as a whole to "fatally 
infect[ the defendant's] trial or sentencing hearing" (emphasis added)); United States v. 
Santos, 369 Fed.Appx. 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the cumulative effect of the 
various harmless errors was insufficient to merit relief under the cumulative error 
doctrine); Cargle v. Mallin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that "when 
considered with the other errors at the sentencing stage, we have no difficulty finding 
cumulative error"); United States V. Lee, 268 Fed.Appx. 813, 816-17 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(indicating it would have applied the cumulative error analysis in a guilty plea case had 
the defendant been able to prove that there were errors in his case); see also United 
States V. Childress, 33 M.J. 602, 606 (A.C.M.R. 1991) (holding that the cumulative 
effect of the errors in that case deprived the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing and 
justified setting aside the sentence). 
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State v. Jose Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453 (1994). When multiple errors are found in 
the record, the appellate court then considers whether, when aggregated, those errors 
deprived the defendant of a fair hearing, and thus, of due process. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 
at 635. 
In this case, the district court made several errors: (1) it deprived Ms. Martinez of 
her Sixth Amendment right to confront an adverse witness; (2) it deprived her of her 
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, § 13 right to due process by not permitting her to 
confront an adverse witness; (3) it erroneously admitted hearsay evidence at sentencing 
without affording Ms. Martinez the opportunity to explain or rebut the assertions therein 
or to test the reliability of the declarant; (4) it unreasonably limited its discretion at the 
sentencing hearing by refusing to hear or consider the testimony of Ms. Lopez; (5) it 
unreasonably limited its discretion at the Rule 35 hearing by refusing to hear or consider 
the testimony of Ms. Martinez's mother; and (6) it set forth an unreasonable global 
limitation on its discretion at Rule 35 hearings. Even if all these errors are harmless 
individually (which, as explained in Sections I and II, supra, they are not), when 
aggregated, they demonstrate that Ms. Martinez was deprived of a fair sentencing 
process. Therefore, she was denied her state and federal constitutional rights to due 




Ms. Martinez respectfully requests that this Court vacate her sentence and 
remand her case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 14th day of August, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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